This paper derives the optimal asset allocation and consumption policy for a retired couple with uncertain lifetime, possible pre-existing annuity income, and a potential bequest motive. The joint life time utility maximizing household can dynamically adjust liquid retirement assets and purchase term life insurance and single as well as joint annuities at any time and incrementally. Joint annuities are appealing for intra-household financial decision making, since they hedge the couple's longevity risk without being contingent on the survival of a certain spouse. The model shows that the demand for life insurance is mostly driven by the aim to protect against the loss of annuity income for the surviving spouse. Especially if pre-existing annuity income is distributed unequally among the partners, the access to life insurance contracts is highly welfare enhancing. In contrast to bonds and risky stocks, term life insurance contracts are not attractive to finance a bequest motive. In an empirical analysis of HRS data we find support for our model result that asymmetries in pension claims among the spouses lead to higher life insurance demand.
Introduction
Couples in retirement face the challenge to derive consumption and investment policies that will maximize their joint lifetime utility subject to pre-existing pension income and retirement savings accumulated during work life. The investment menu for the retirement nest-egg may include capital market instruments, typically stocks and bonds, or insurance products, such as term life insurance or various types of life annuity contracts. As of now, it is an open question how retired couples should optimally combine these products in their retirement portfolio. The majority of papers in the life cycle literature analyze optimal portfolio strategies either for single individuals or, when looking at households, for single representative agents. Variation in family size, however, is in general not modeled explicitly. 1 The contribution of this paper is to shed more light on the joint financial decision making of retired couples, by developing a realistically calibrated dynamic two-person life cycle consumption and portfolio choice model that explicitly accounts for uncertainty in both lifetimes. This model allows us to derive a couples' optimal demand for risk-free bonds, risky stocks, (single and joint) annuities, and term life insurance policies. Moreover, the model enables us to answer the question as to what is the key driver of life insurance demand, a provision motive or a pure bequest motive (Modigliani 1988 and Hurd 1999) . According to the former, term life insurance is purchased to ensure that a surviving spouse will be able to afford an adequate level of consumption after the partner's death and the resulting loss of his or her life-contingent income. According to the latter, life insurance is purchased to support the couple in bequeathing wealth to the next generation. In this sense, our paper also contributes to the literature on the role of the bequest motive in life cycle portfolio choice. Bernheim (1991) and, more recently, Inkmann and Michaelidis (2012) argue that the empirically observable life insurance demand of households in the US and the UK indicates the existence of a bequest motive. Yet, both papers base their analysis on a model that does not allow for uncertainty in family size. Hence, they are unable to determine whether holding life insurance aims at supporting intra-family or intergenerational wealth transfer.
Consequently, these models are unable to describe the effects of a death of one of the spouses on the financial position and consumption choice of the surviving partner.
We find that couples seek to build up a retirement portfolio with a survival-contingent income stream that is balanced between the two partners. Here, a key driver is the consumption scaling factor, which describes the change in consumption required to maintain a household's utility level upon a change in family size. 2 While our analysis is primarily normative, we show that our model predictions are consistent with empirical evidence. Using US data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), we show that, for most retired couples, pension income from sources other than Social Security is asymmetrically distributed between husbands and wives. We also show that husbands are more likely to hold term life insurance than wives, and that they hold much higher insurance face values. Econometric analyses indicate that husbands' higher participation ratios as well as face values are statistically significantly related to the degree of asymmetry in the couple's pension income distribution. By contrast, the number of children has no significant impact on a retired couple's life insurance demand. Both results are in line with the prediction of our theoretical model and support the hypothesis that term life insurance demand of retired couples is mostly driven by a provision motive and not by a pure bequest motive.
Moreover, we show that the demand for term life insurance is primarily driven by the provision motive and only to a much lesser extent by a pure bequest motive. In particular, if a large fraction of retirement wealth is pre-annuitized for only one spouse, life insurance contracts are purchased to insure against the loss of annuity income due to an early death of this partner. This result is valid independent of whether the couple has a pure bequest motive or not. In case one of the spouses dies, the surviving partner has almost no demand for term life insurance even in the presence of a bequest motive. Intended intergenerational wealth transfer is preferably financed by a balanced portfolio of stocks and bonds. Only couples with relatively low liquid wealth at retirement will purchase term life insurance to provide for bequests.
In addition HRS data show that for most retired households the old age insurance benefits from Social Security are the major part of retirement income. In practice, these benefits, which are comparable to a joint and survivor annuity, are well balanced for a couple and provide relative generous survivor benefits in the range of one half to two thirds. Therefore, for retired couples with moderate financial wealth at retirement the purchase of additional annuities provides only marginal welfare increasing effects. This might explain (at least in part) why so few households participate in the private annuity market (also referred as to the annuity participation puzzle). This paper builds on and extends previous research on the impact of longevity risk on life cycle portfolio choice in several directions. Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) show that mortality risk pooling in multi-individual households leads to welfare gains comparable to having access to the annuity market. Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1991) discuss the role of life insurance in protecting a sustainable consumption level for widows, and they show that the life insurance holdings for many US-couples are too low. Brown and Poterba (2000) study couples' welfare gains from having access to joint life annuity products, based on the annuity equivalent wealth framework developed by Mitchell et al. (1999) . Their findings suggest that these gains can be as high as 70% of retirement wealth, depending on preference parameters and the amount of pre-existing annuity income. However, their assumptions are quite restrictive: the model setting only allows for complete annuitization of all accumulated assets at the beginning of the retirement phase, given an exogenously specified survivor benefit factor. Moreover, they do not allow for investments in risky stocks or life insurance contracts, and they only compare welfare gains of an annuitization strategy against a benchmark of risk-free bonds.
Recent studies by Horneff et al. (2008 Horneff et al. ( , 2009 Horneff et al. ( , 2010 integrate individual annuities into realistically calibrated lifecycle portfolio choice models, allowing for risky stock investments and optimal gradual annuitization strategies. They demonstrate that these products are welfare enhancing in that they offer consumers an effective hedge against individual longevity risk as well as the opportunity to trade liquidity for a survival-contingent extra return known as the 'survival credit'. Yet, they model a single household rather than a couple. Moreover, they do not include term life insurance in their investment universe. In what follows, we present the structure of our life cycle model for a retired couple that has access to the various products to manage their consumption and bequest requirements. We then explore and discuss the role of these products in optimal life cycle profiles.
Subsequently, we compare our model predictions with empirical evidence from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). A final section concludes.
The Life Cycle Optimization Model for a Retired Couple

Family Dynamics
We model a couple in retirement that faces an uncertain lifespan governed by genderspecific one-year survival probabilities and . Here and in the following, ( ) represents the husband (wife) as well as his (her) age and = (0, . . . , ) the time after the couple retired (measured in years). We assume that the survival probabilities are independent, such that decease of one spouse does not affect the survival probability of the other spouse.
At each point in time, the couple may be in either one of four different family states : both being alive, wife having deceased (widower), husband having deceased (widow), and both having deceased. Using indicator variables and , which are 1 if the wife/husband is alive at time and zero otherwise, these four states can be represented by (1)
The time-dependent transition matrix Π , = ( +1 = | = ) of this Markov chain is specified by the individual one-year survival probabilities:
(2)
At the end of our projection horizon , we set = = 0. We neglect all not mortality driven family changes such as a divorce or a new partnership after one of the spouses has died.
Financial Products
The couple can choose among different financial products to manage retirement income and potential bequests: riskless bonds, risky stocks, term life insurances and annuities. Bonds have a constant annual real gross rate of return, represented by . The annual gross returns of stocks are serially independent and identically lognormally distributed; +1 represents the return from time to + 1.
At each time , a one-year term life insurance contract can be purchased for each living spouse { , }. If the insured spouse dies within the period [ , + 1], the insurer will pay the face value at time + 1. The insurance premium including a loading factor LI is given by the discounted expected payout
Similar to life insurance products, single annuities can be purchased for each spouse separately. We denote by ̅ a normalized annuity that pays every year the constant amount of one monetary unit as long as the annuitant { , } is alive. The gender-and agedependent annuity factor ̈ , which is the price of ̅ at time with a loading factor , is given by
Here , denotes the probability that spouse is alive at time conditional on being alive at time , which is the product , = ∏ −1 = of the one-year survival probabilities.
A normalized joint annuity ̅ pays one monetary unit as long as at least one of the spouses is alive. The corresponding annuity factor is given by
Here , denotes the probability, that at least one of the spouses is alive at time , conditional on both being alive at time
Replication of Any Joint Annuity
Most joint annuities available do not pay a constant amount until the last spouse dies.
Typically a survivor benefit ratio ≤ 1 is chosen, to which the payment level is reduced upon the first death. We call these annuities ̅ ( ) with a selectable survivor benefit ratio K%-joint annuities. We do not have to explicitly include these annuities in our model, since any survivor benefit ratio can be replicated using the three elementary annuities ̅ , ̅ , and ̅ according to
In turn, this enables us to interpret a given portfolio of single annuities for the husband ̅ , single annuities for the wife ̅ , and joint annuities ̅ as a portfolio of a K%-joint annuity and residual income from a single annuity. To specify , we choose to maximize the benefits attributed to the implied K%-joint annuity. Hence, if (without loss of generality) we assume that > , the portfolio of the three elementary annuities can be reinterpreted as 
This can be illustrated using a simple example. Let us assume that the husband (wife) receives a single annuity income of 5 (4) and both receive an additional income of 3 from a joint annuity, i.e. = 5, = 4, = 3. Combining the joint annuity income of 3 with an income of 4 taken from each of the single annuities is equivalent to an income of 11 from an implied K%-joint annuity with = 4+3 4+4+3 = 7 11 ≈ 64%. This leaves the husband (wife) with a residual single annuity income of 1 (0).
Wealth Dynamics
In each period the household has to decide how much of its liquid wealth ( ) to spend on consumption ( ), life insurance premiums ( , ) and annuity premiums ( , ,
). Moreover, the household has to choose the fraction of the remaining wealth that will be invested in stocks ( ). Next period's liquid wealth is given by the remaining wealth including capital market returns, annuity income ( , , ), and, in case one of the spouses has deceased, payments from life insurance contracts ( , ):
The dynamics of the annuity payments , , and are given by
We impose that the household is liquidity constraint, such that money cannot be borrowed for financing consumption, insurance products, or stock investments. Furthermore we do not allow short positions in stocks, life insurance, and annuity products:
Annuities are illiquid in the sense that the household is prevented from selling annuities.
Thus, previously purchased annuity income cannot be reduced and the range of attainable survivor benefit ratios in the embedded K%-joint annuities is restricted to 0.5 ≤ ≤ 1.
Finally, it is self-evident that we allow for purchases of life insurance and annuities products for the living only. So, for example, a widow may still buy single annuities for herself, but no joint annuities.
Optimization Problem
The household draws utility from consumption according to a time-additive utility function of the constant relative risk aversion type:
where represents the level of relative risk aversion. Following Love (2010), we normalize the total consumption by the scaling factor , which depends on the family state .
( , , ) = max
where represents the time preference rate. The value function is governed by the state variables liquid wealth , the vector of annuity payments = � , , �′, and family state . The controls are consumption , asset allocation , premiums for annuity purchases as well as premiums for life insurance purchases .
In case both spouses are alive ( = 1), the expectation in the value function is given by
The expectations on the right hand side are conditioned on the family state +1 and the associated future value functions are only weighted by corresponding survival probabilities.
Hence, we do not consider one of the spouses to be a decision maker, who puts more weight on her/his value function. For widowers and widows ( = {2,3}) the expectation only includes one term for the survival of the remaining spouse and one in which the last spouse has deceased, weighted in accordance with the family state transition matrix (2.2).
In case both spouses have deceased ( = 4), the form of the value function depends on the strength of the couple's bequest motive ( ):
At time the survival probabilities are zero and the terminal conditions are given by
The optimization problem is homothetic in wealth. Hence, we can decrease the computational effort by normalizing the annuity payments by liquid wealth and thereby reducing the number of continuous state variables. The value function then takes the form
with the normalized annuity vector A three dimensional grid for annuity payments is only necessary as long as both spouses are alive ( = 1). For a widow/widower ( = {2,3}) it is sufficient to only track total annuity payments, which we discretize on a 20 × 1 grid.
On every grid point we solve for the optimal control variables by evaluating the expectation of the future value function using Gaussian quadrature integration over the stock return realizations and cubic spline interpolation.
Model Calibration
In our base case calibration, we follow Brown and Poterba (2000) and set the initial age of the husband to 65 and that of the wife to 62, which they argue is a representative calibration for US family structures. Our projection horizon is = 39 years, i.e. the maximum age of the husband (wife) is 103 (100). The objective one-period survival probabilities ( , ), which For the couple we choose a consumption scaling factor of =1 = 1.3. This value is in line with the average scaling factor reported in Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2007), who summarize the literature on household equivalence scales. Hence, our value is below the 1.7
used by the OECD (OECD, 1982) but higher than the empirically estimated 1.06 in Lazear and Michael (1980) and Nelson (1988) .
Following Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) , the real risk free interest rate is set to 2% ( = 1.02) and the parameters for the lognormal stock distribution are chosen such, that the risk premium is 4% ( [ ] − = 4%) and the stock volatility is 20%.
The survival probabilities used for the pricing insurance products differ from the average survival probabilities in the population entering the utility function. For the pricing of life insurance we use composite mortality rates from the 2001 Commissioners Standard Ordinary (CSO) Mortality Table. We price the annuities with Annuity 2000 Mortality Table of the Society of Actuaries. Additionally we impose loadings of LI = A = 2% as transaction fees on both products, which are the self reported costs on fixed annuities by Vanguard.
The combination of different life tables and loading factors leads to age dependent total costs in comparison to actuarially fair priced products according to the subjective survival probabilities. Because of the higher survival probabilities in the annuity compared to the population life table the total costs vary between 13.5% for joint annuities at age 65 up to 33.6% for single annuities for males at age 85. For most ages also the CSO table has higher survival probabilities than the population table resulting in negative (implied) loadings for life insurance. The total costs for life insurance therefore vary between -15.8% and 7.8%.
In line with empirical evidence from the US annuities markets, the maximum age at which annuities can be bought is set to 85. While we are able to model annuities as the illiquid long term investments they are, we have to restrict ourselves to one-year term life insurance contracts for computational reasons. Modeling long term contracts would require two additional (continuous) state variables for tracking life insurance purchases in previous periods. Long term contracts can, however, be qualitatively replicated by repeated purchases of one-year term life insurance, provided that these are available over the complete horizon. Hence, we allow for life insurance purchases up to year − 1, although this may provide undue flexibility in adjusting life insurance holdings.
Results
Life Cycle Profiles -Base Case Calibration
In this section analyzes the household's optimal life cycle behavior. To this end, we present average results of 10,000 simulated life cycles based on the previously derived optimal controls. While these controls account for potential changes in the family state, we only present life cycle profiles with both spouses being alive, i.e. we fix the family state to = 1 in the simulation. This approach ensures that the displayed profiles focus on the decisions of couples and are not mixed with those of singles, whose annuitization behavior is already well documented in the literature.
In what follows, we assume that the couple retires at age 65/62 4 4 In the following we only refer to the husband's age, keeping in mind that the wife is three years younger.
with an overall retirement wealth of 100 monetary units. With respect to the retirement nest-egg we distinguish three initial allocations. First, the couple's endowment consists of liquid wealth only. Second, the initial endowment consists of liquid wealth and an annuity income, which is reduced to 67% of the initial amount after the first death. Such a K67%-joint annuity can be considered as a portfolio of three annuities that pay the same benefits: a single-life annuity for both, the husband and the wife as well as a joint annuity. Hence, annuity income is symmetrically distributed between the two spouses. US Social Security retirement benefits resemble such an annuity. Even if, for instance, only the husband has worked, the wife qualifies for marital benefits as long as the husband is alive and for widow benefits after his death. The third initial endowment is a combination of liquid wealth and asymmetrically distributed annuity income. Here, only one half of the annuity income is drawn from a symmetric K67%-joint annuity. The other half is provided by a single annuity for the husband. Total income will therefore be reduced to 83% if the wife dies but to only 33% if the husband deceases. This can be interpreted as a case, in which the husband, on top of Social Security, receives a defined benefit pension without survivor benefits. 5 In case of the second and third allocation, the income level is chosen such that the wealth to income ratio is 8, while still fixing the total wealth to 100 for better comparability between the settings.
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Figure 1 presents the life cycle profile for a couple that is only endowed with liquid wealth and that has no access to private annuity markets. In the absence of any annuity income, the problem is effectively reduced to the Merton (1969) case. Accordingly, while liquid wealth is continuously depleted to finance consumption, the relative amount invested in stocks remains constant over time at 21.8%. Despite their bequest motive, the couple does not purchase any life insurance. Since there is no alternative to holding liquid wealth for financing future consumption, they automatically hold liquid wealth to provide for bequests.
Furthermore, the death of one spouse is not a negative shock, economically. The surviving spouse has to consume less than the couple to draw the same utility, while liquid wealth is unaffected by the death of the spouse. Consequently, there is no risk for the couple that needs to be hedged through life insurance. Consumption is high early in retirement, since they anticipate that one spouse may die and that subsequently only the survivor needs to finance consumption. As the couple ages, however, consumption declines quickly. At age 95, the couple consumes less than half of what they consumed at age 65.
We first study these settings for couples without access to the private annuity market and, subsequently, the second and third setting with access to the private annuity market.
In further simulations, not presented here, which analyze the behavior of a surviving spouse after the first death, we also find no demand for life insurance and an identical stock weight.
One reason is that a single spouse's problem is almost identical to that of a couple: financing consumption without pension income. Moreover, stock returns are independent of the spouses' survival and, hence, there is no hedging demand with respect to changes in the family status.
5 By default, US defined benefit plans provide a survivor benefit of 50%, unless both spouses decide otherwise. Here, we refrain from including survivor benefits, because otherwise this setting would not differ significantly from our second case with symmetrical annuitization. 6 For the wealth/income ratio we define wealth as savings and exclude the current income. Otherwise it would be less comparable to the empirical data with monthly income. The chosen value of 8 is near the mean of the HRS sample reported in Section 4.2, Table 3 . 7 While the prices of additional private annuities are calculated using annuitant mortality tables and include explicit costs, the present value of existing annuity income is calculated based on actuarially fair annuity factors with objective survival probabilities and without costs. This is justified because Social Security and employersponsored DB plans face less risk of adverse selection and charge lower fees than providers of private annuities.
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In case initial retirement wealth is partially and symmetrically pre-annuitized, the optimal life cycle profile is quite similar to the one discussed above (see Figure 2) . Liquid wealth and consumption, however, decrease less rapidly, since the couple receives a constant income even at advanced ages. In general, consumption is higher than in the case without any pension income, indicating that the symmetrically annuitized wealth increases the couple's welfare.
Between ages 65 and 80, there is small and diminishing demand for life insurance on the husband. As the wife has higher survival probabilities than her husband, she is more likely to be widowed and would, in expectation, has to finance consumption for longer than a widower. For this, she needs sufficient liquid wealth, since, upon her husband's death, annuity income is reduced by one third, whereas consumption needs only decrease by about 23%. Triggered by the provision motive, the husband holds some life insurance to help bridging the income gap that arises in case of his death. The initial face value, however, amounts to only 3.5. This is less than both the household's annual annuity income and consumption, such that life insurance payouts would only contribute little to the widow's consumption. The husband, on the other hand, is financially less affected by an early death of his wife. While he faces the same disproportionate reduction in both annuity income and consumption needs, he has a relatively ample supply of liquid wealth due to his much shorter remaining planning horizon. Consequently, the couple does not purchase life insurance on the wife. The complete absence of any life insurance holdings at advanced ages indicates that life insurance is not purchased to finance bequests. Moreover, further simulations show that even if one spouse dies, the surviving partner only holds negligible amounts of life insurance. Therefore, we can conclude that bequests are predominantly financed through liquid wealth.
The most pronounced difference between this and the first case is the substantially higher stock weight. Initially, 71.6% of liquid wealth is invested in stocks. This number decreases as the ratio of liquid wealth to the present value of annuity income increases.
8 resembles a risk free, bond-like investment. Consequently, the couple will shift more of its liquid wealth into equities, in order to adjust the overall risk exposure of total household wealth, i.e. the sum of liquid wealth and annuitized wealth. In fact, the share of total wealth (including the present value of annuities) invested in stocks remains fairly constant over time, between 22% and 24%, which is nearly the same value as in the first case. The fraction of liquid wealth invested in stocks is comparable to the symmetrical case, even though the decline at advanced ages is less pronounced. The fraction of total wealth held in equities is again slightly above 20% and almost constant over time.
At the same time, the couple has to cut consumption in order to finance substantial life insurance purchases for the husband. In case the husband dies, the widow's income will drop to only 33% of its previous level, well short of what is required to finance a utility-equivalent consumption stream. Consequently, there is strong incentive to provide for her consumption with additional liquid wealth from life insurance payouts. By contrast, in case the wife dies, the widower would receive 83% of the couple's income. Hence, annuity income decreases less than consumption requirements. Without having to provide for the husband, there is no demand for life insurance on the wife. At age 65, the couple spends 0.46 on purchasing life insurance on the husband with a face value of 27.2, approximately 70% of liquid wealth. This is sufficient to finance the widow's consumption for more than six years. With increasing age, the wife's expected remaining lifetime decreases and so does the need to hold life insurance on the husband. Consequently, the face value declines over time.
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expenses, the liquidity needs for transaction purposes, as well as behavioral aspects; see e.g. Gomes/Michaelidis (2005) . 9 Due to the asymmetrical distribution of pension income, the couple's annuity portfolio holds more of the cheaper single annuities for the husband. As we again fix total initial wealth at 100 and the wealth to income ratio at 8, this implies that total household income is slightly higher than in the case with symmetrical preannuitization.
Next, we allow the couple to also purchase additional annuities. Figure 4 presents the results for the case with symmetrically pre-annuitized wealth. Early in retirement, the profile is essentially identical to the case without access to the private annuity market. Despite the fact that the implicit loading factors of the annuities increase with age, the couple postpones purchasing additional annuities in an effort to hedge against the risk of an early death of one of the spouses. Instead of buying expensive joint annuities early in retirement, they prefer to wait. In case one of the spouses dies, the surviving spouse can buy the cheaper single annuities for him-or herself. Only at age 85, the last year in which annuities can be purchased, the couple substantially increases annuity holdings. While the wife has a higher remaining lifetime in expectation, even at advanced ages it is not unlikely that a husband will actually outlive his wife. Consequently, the couple refrains from considerably increasing the annuity income of either of the spouses and instead purchases the more expensive joint annuities, which also provide income to the last survivor. As it is more likely that the wife outlives her husband, the couple slightly increases her single annuity income.
Interestingly, access to the private annuity market has hardly any influence on life insurance holdings. Compared to the situation with symmetrical pre-annuitization and no access to additional annuities, this case only differs in that the couple will purchase negligible amounts of life insurance for the wife after age 85. These purchases can be attributed to the small amount of additional single annuities for the wife that the couple buys at age 85. The substantial purchases of joint annuities at age 85, on the other hand, do not trigger life insurance purchases, despite the reduction in liquid wealth available for possible bequests. This is further evidence for the hypothesis that term life insurance is not held to provide for bequests.
Shifting a substantial fraction of liquid wealth into annuities reduces the household's overall risk position. This is compensated by increasing the share of liquid wealth that the couple invests in equities. Again, stock holdings relative to total wealth remain fairly constant.
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Figure 5 finally presents our results for a couple with asymmetrically pre-annuitized initial wealth and with access to additional private annuities. In contrast to the case with symmetrical pre-annuitization, where the couple has no annuity demand prior to age 85, the household will immediately begin purchasing single annuities for the wife to reduce the degree of asymmetry in the distribution of lifelong income. The wife's annuity income is again built up only gradually, as there is some risk that she might die early. At age 85, the couple makes a final bulk purchase of single annuities for her and also buys a small amount of additional joint annuities. Having a bequest motive, however, the couple cannot fully deplete liquid wealth and is therefore limited with respect to last minute annuity purchases.
As a result, annuity income is still asymmetrically distributed after age 85. Even when having access to the private annuity market, a couple with asymmetrically pre-annuitized retirement wealth holds large amounts of life insurance on the husband. Yet, face values are slightly lower than in the case without access to additional annuities, as the wife now has the opportunity to use life insurance payouts more efficiently by buying additional annuities for herself instead of just consuming the payouts. After age 85, even the wife holds some life insurance. This and the purchase of additional joint annuities indicate that even the betterendowed widower cannot finance future consumption and bequest motive with his income, as liquid wealth has already been reduced substantially.. In this case with comparably little liquid wealth remaining, we therefore cannot rule out that life insurance is purchased to finance bequest. Yet, the face values of the wife's life insurance are still substantially lower than the remaining liquid savings. 
Sensitivity and Welfare Analysis
In this section we analyze the sensitivity of life insurance demand with respect to variations in key parameters of our model. To this end, we conduct comparative statics analyses, beginning with our baseline calibration and varying one parameter at the time. The parameters of interest include the initial wealth to income ratio, the strength of the (pure) bequest motive, the level of jointness in consumption, the age difference between husband and wife, and the couple's relative risk aversion. Moreover, we study the effect of restricting access to the stock market as well as the impact of broken heart effects, i.e. Consequently, it is not optimal to substantially increase life insurance holdings.
By contrast, the consumption scaling factor has a large impact on life insurance demand. In case the factor is smaller, a widow has to consume almost as much as the couple did before in order to maintain the level of utility. As she will only receive a much smaller income, the couple holds a substantial amount of life insurance to provide sufficient additional liquid wealth in case the husband dies. For a consumption scaling factor of 1.1 the face value amounts to 8.2 times the annual income. A higher scaling factor will, in turn, reduce life insurance holdings.
Couples with a higher age difference between husband and wife have a higher demand for term life insurance; 6.58 times the annual income in case the wife is 8 years younger than the husband. Being much younger, the wife has a substantial probability of outliving her partner. At the same time, she will have to live on the substantially reduced income for a longer period. The resulting need of supplemental financial wealth drives up insurance face values.
Interestingly, both low and high risk aversion result in lower demand for life insurance. A couple with a parameter of relative risk aversion of = 2 ( = 8) will purchase life insurance with an initial face value of 6.05 (6.21) times the annual income. In case of low risk aversion, the couple's expected utility is less affected by the risk that the widow might face a substantial drop in income and consumption. Consequently, there is less demand for life insurance. A very risk averse couple, on the other hand, will consume less earlier in retirement and retain more liquid wealth. Both effects reduce the potential widow's exposure to the inevitable income loss in case the husband dies and, hence, the demand for life insurance on the husband.
Without access to the stock market, the couple cannot cash in on the equity premium.
Consequently, they are less wealthy in expectation and the wife faces a higher risk of suffering a substantial drop in consumption. In an effort to compensate this reduction in wealth, the couple increases initial life insurance demand to 6.44 times the annual income.
Finally, we study the impact of interdependence of mortality rates on life insurance demand.
Several studies provide empirical evidence that the death of one partner may temporarily increase the mortality of the surviving spouse (see, for instance, Young et al. 1963 , Parkes et al. 1969 , Helsing and Szklo 1981 , and Jagger and Sutton 1991 . This so-called Broken Heart
Effect has been shown to be more pronounced for widowers than for widows. In our analysis, we study the impact of a very strong Broken Heart effect, assuming that the mortality of a widower (widow) will not only be temporarily but permanently increased by 35% (15%).
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Turning to the scenario with access to additional annuities in Column 2 of Table 1 , we find that for all calibrations except low risk aversion life insurance demand is lower than in the case without access to private annuities. There are two reasons for this. First, the couple purchases single annuities for the wife and therefore the asymmetry between both spouses is reduced. Second, life insurance payouts can be utilized more effectively by the widow, because she can purchase additional annuities from that money instead of merely investing it in stocks and bonds. Therefore less money is needed to finance the same level of consumption.
These numbers are at the higher end of what has been found empirically.
Despite this substantial Broken Heart Effect, the initial face value averages 6.19 times the annual income, only marginally lower than in the base case. This result is driven by two offsetting effects. Due to the increase in the widow's mortality, consumption has to be financed for a shorter time period, which has a negative impact on life insurance demand. At the same time, the Broken Heart Effect generally reduces the time preference rate and, hence, renders the couple more impatient. Consequently, the couple's consumption is higher early in retirement and so is the wife's utility-equivalent consumption need in widowhood. With lower liquid wealth remaining due to higher consumption, the demand for life insurance increases.
Next, we seek to quantify the welfare gains of having access to term life insurance. To this end, we determine the increases in certainty equivalent wealth and annuity income at age 65 for the different parameterizations studied above. The certainty equivalent is defined as the inverse of the value function:
For a given family state and fixed relative annuity payments (= ⁄ ), the certainty equivalent is proportional to wealth . Consequently, an % increase in the certainty equivalent corresponds to an % increase in both liquid wealth as well as annuity income.
Our findings are presented in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1. Without having access to the private annuity market, the baseline couple will enjoy welfare gains of 5.4% from being able to purchase term life insurance. Comparable utility increases are found for the cases with no bequest motive, a high age difference, no access to the stock market, as well as in case the couple is subject to a strong Broken Heart Effect. High wealth to income ratios and consumption scaling factors as well as low risk aversion will result in substantially lower welfare gains, which only average 1.7% -3.5%. With values ranging between 7.6% and 11.5%, term life insurance proves to be particularly valuable for those with high risk aversion as well as low consumption scaling factors and wealth to income ratios.
As discussed above, having access to the private annuity market reduces the appeal of term life insurance, since the couple is able to reduce the income distribution asymmetry by purchasing single annuities for the wife. Yet, access to life insurance still proves to substantially increase welfare for most parameterizations. With access to private annuities, welfare gains are in general about 0.5% lower than in case the couple cannot purchase additional annuities. In case the couple has a low wealth to income ratio or no bequest motive, however, welfare gains are in fact substantially higher, by 1.8% and 0.8% respectively. Table 1 here 
Pure Bequest Motives and Life Insurance Demand
So far, our findings suggest that term life insurance is primarily purchased to overcome asymmetries in the distribution of retirement income and that pure bequest motives have hardly any effect on life insurance holdings. In what follows, we will show that a key driver of this result is the couple's endowment with liquid wealth. To this end, Table 2 presents the couple's life insurance demand for alternative wealth to income ratios. Here we assume that pre-existing annuity income is symmetrically distributed between the spouses, in order to reduce the impact of the provision motive. As both spouses hold life insurance in this set-up, we report the couple's combined initial life insurance face value, again expressed in multiples of annual income.
Our baseline couple with bequest motives and a wealth to income ratio of 8 will hold life insurance with a face value of 0.87 times the annual income. Without a bequest motive, the demand of an otherwise equal couple amounts to 0.79. Consequently, only about 9% of life insurance holdings can be attributed to the bequest motive. By contrast, if the couple has no liquid wealth at all, including a bequest motive will increase life insurance demand from 1.95 to 2.79 times the annual income. Hence, about 30% of life insurance demand is directly related to the bequest motive.
This wealth effect becomes even more apparent when completely excluding the provision motive by setting the consumption scaling factor to = 1.5. Under this parameterization, both retirement income as well as utility-equivalent consumption will drop to two-thirds in case one of the spouses dies. Consequently, life insurance demand can mainly be attributed to a bequest motive. Here we find that there is no life insurance demand for our baseline wealth to income ratio of 8. Hence, the couple is sufficiently endowed with liquid wealth to finance bequest. By contrast, with no wealth available, the couple will hold life insurance worth 1.4 times the annual income. Face values quickly decrease with increasing wealth levels. Already for a wealth to income ratio of 2 there is hardly any bequest-related life insurance demand left. 
Empirical Analysis of Life Insurance Demand
Motivation
The central insight from our normative, model-based analysis in the previous section is that asymmetries in the spouses' income stream in retirement are the key determinant of the couple's demand for private annuities as well as term life insurance. Decisions to participate in insurance markets are mainly driven by a provision motive, i.e. the desire to ensure that the death of one spouse will not be excessively harmful to the surviving spouse, financially.
Pure bequest motives, on the other hand, are shown to only play a minor role in explaining a couple's demand for term life insurance. Just those with very little liquid wealth will increase life insurance holdings due to bequest motives. This raises the question as to whether our model predictions are in line with empirically observable behavior of retired couples. To address this issue, we conduct an econometric analysis aiming at identifying the drivers of life insurance demand based on survey data for elderly US couples. We focus on life insurance and disregard private annuities, as previous studies, which analyzed a comparable dataset, already documented that empirically observable demand for private annuities is negligible.
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We proceed as follows: the next section will provide detailed information about the construction of our dataset as well as descriptive statistics of the main covariates.
Subsequently, we will present the results of our probit and OLS regression analyses of the demand for life insurance.
Our analysis will
show that, in accordance with our model predictions, asymmetry in the distribution of pension income among the spouses is a central explanatory variable of both the probability to hold life insurance as well as the amount held, while proxies for a pure bequest motive, in particular the number of children, have no significant impact on life insurance holdings.
Dataset and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical analysis draws on data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a biannual longitudinal panel study of American households over the age of 50.
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Our analysis focuses on couple households with exactly two respondents of different gender, excluding all divorced or separated households. Of the remaining couples, 99.4% are married and 0.6% are partnered. To study households similar to those in our model, we exclude households in which the husband is less than 65 years old. Moreover, we only include couples that receive social security retirement income for at least one of the spouses and exclude those that receive any labor income. To avoid distortions due to outliers, we exclude those households that are in the top 5% of both the financial wealth and the 12 For example, Johnson et al. (2004) report that only 6% of US adults aged 65 and older receive income from (own and spouse's) private annuities. Moreover, they show that, on average, private annuity income (wealth) only accounts for a mere 1% of total household income (wealth). 13 For more information on the HRS, we refer to the survey website at the University of Michigan: http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/index.php.
household income distribution, as well as those with negative financial wealth. This leaves us with 2313 households.
Several key variables included in our analysis are not directly provided with the survey data and have to be constructed. All dollar amounts are adjusted for inflation and denoted in 2010 dollars. Household income is calculated as the sum of social security retirement benefits and pension annuities of both spouses. Financial wealth is derived as the sum of saving and checking accounts, certificates of deposits, government saving bonds, treasury bills, stocks, mutual funds and the value of IRA and Keogh accounts minus nonmortgage debts. Hence, financial wealth does neither include housing wealth nor the present value of social security benefits or pension annuities. Moreover the survey does not directly distinguish between holding term life insurance and endowment plans. We identify term life insurance holders as holders of life insurance that does not build up any cash value.
As a measure of asymmetry in the distribution of pension income among the spouses we use the pension income share. This is calculated as the ratio of a spouse's income from private pensions and the couples' total income from private pensions. We refrain from including Social Security income in our asymmetry measure. Even if only one spouse is entitled to Social Security, survivor income will effectively not be asymmetrically distributed because of the generous widow(er) benefits. By contrast, the survivor benefit of company pensions is set to only 50% by default and may even be lower, such that skewed distributions are effectively also asymmetrical. Turning to private pensions, which mostly originate from occupational DB plans, our dataset exhibits even greater asymmetries in participation and income between husbands and wives. About 60% of husbands receive income from private pensions, 58% in the age group 65-69 and 62% of husbands in their late 70s. For wives, these numbers halve. Only 28% (33%) of wives aged 65-69 (75-79) receive pension income other than Social Security.
Conditional on either of the spouses receiving pension income, the husbands' share of this income averages 77% in the late 60s and 75% in the late 70s. 
Econometric Evidence
Next we identify the key drivers of couples' demand for term life insurance in two steps.
First, we conduct a probit analysis with respect to the propensity to hold insurance. Then, we estimate an OLS regression on LI face values for insurance holders. Table 4 presents marginal effects on a spouse's probability to hold life insurance.
These are calculated for a baseline non-stockholding 65 years old male spouse, who has a three years younger wife (sample mean: 2.55), 3 children (sample mean: 3.2), household log financial wealth of 10.97, and log household income of 10.24 (both numbers equal to sample means). The pension income share is set to 50%, i.e. pension income in the base case is symmetrically distributed among the two spouses. In accordance with our model predictions in Figures 2 -5 and Table 1 , the likelihood to hold life insurance is lower for wives than for husbands. Moreover, it decreases with increasing age and financial wealth, while it increases with household income and, especially, with the asymmetry in the distribution of private pension income. We find that a wife's probability to hold life insurance is 2.63% lower than that of a husband. Increasing a spouse's age by 10 years or the household's log financial wealth by one standard deviation, i.e. 2.21, has a similar impact on the probability to hold life insurance. It is reduced by 2.61% and 2.69%, respectively. We also find that the decision to (actively) participate in the stock market reduces life insurance participation by 3.10%. In turn, if the spouse is the sole earner of pension income, its participation probability increases by 4.2%, and a one standard deviation (0.55) increase in log household income results in a 3.52% higher probability to hold life insurance. Moreover, Table 4 suggests that the number of children, which may be a proxy for having a pure bequest motive, only has a negligible and insignificant impact on the likelihood to participate in the life insurance market. Increasing the number of children by one will increase the probability by only 0.43%.
Finally, the age difference between the spouses also proves to have an insignificant impact on the decision to hold life insurance.
Table 4 here
The results of our OLS regression on life insurance face values are reported in Table 5 .
Again, household income and asymmetry in the distribution of pension income are found to have statistically highly significant positive impact on individual life insurance holdings, while gender and age exhibit highly significant negative coefficients. As in our previous analysis, the number of children proves to have no significant impact on life insurance holdings. In contrast to the results from our probit analysis, where financial wealth was found to reduce the participation probability, it has a positive and significant impact on life insurance face values for those who participate. Moreover, the age difference now has a small but statistically significant positive impact, while stock market participation does not affect life insurance faces values. In order to gain more insight into the economic significance of our regression results, Table 5 also presents the marginal effects of variations in the regressors on life insurance face values. These are derived by first calculating the predicted face value for the baseline individual from our probit analysis and then relating this value to the predicted face value that results from a deviation in the respective regressor. The face value of life insurance held by a female spouse is predicted to be about 47% below that of a male spouse. An increase in age of 10 years will also almost halve the predicted face value (-48.37%) . Being the sole receiver of pension income will increase the face value of this spouse's life insurance by 9%. A one standard deviation increase in log financial wealth (log household income) will drive up face values by 15.23% (9.76%). Compared to these numbers, changes in stock market participation, age difference, and the number of children only have economically insignificant impact on life insurance face values. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we present a life cycle asset allocation model for a couple in retirement with access to the markets for stocks, annuities, and life insurance. For this couple, uncertainty about their joint lifetimes is the major risk. This risk has two aspects. On the one hand, the couple might outlive their assets. On the other hand, an early death of one spouse might deprive the surviving partner of highly valued annuity income. Our paper aims at investigating how the couple can optimally hedge these risks by dynamically investing into annuities, life insurance, stocks and bonds. Here, we particularly focus on the use of term life insurance.
We show that couples strive to achieve a symmetrical income distribution among both spouses. Optimal annuity portfolios have a large share of joint annuities or, equivalently, high survivor benefits. In the case of a preexisting asymmetrical income distribution term life insurance is an effective product to insure survival contingent annuity income of the major earner against an early death and enhances the couple's welfare substantially. For financing bequest, however, liquid wealth is preferred over term life insurance. Only in cases, for which liquid wealth is very low in comparison to the annual income, life insurance is used to support bequest.
In our empirical analysis of the HRS data set we find degree of asymmetry in pension income has a significant positive effect on the probability of holding life insurance as well as the size of the face values. The number of children as a proxy for a bequest motive does not increase life insurance demand.
An aspect not accounted for in our analysis is the modeling of health risk. French (2005), Yogo (2009), and Pang and Warshawsky (2010) include uncertain health status in their life cycle models and show a significant impact on the degree of annuitization. Another interesting extension to our model could be the inclusion of self-used real estate in fashion of Cocco (2005) and Yao and Zhang (2005) , since home equity is an important part of the portfolios of elderly couples. Notes: Effect of parameter and setting variations on life insurance demand and utility gains from access to life insurance for both cases with and without access to the annuity market. Life insurance demand: Face value of husband's life insurance in first period in multiples of total household income for asymmetrical preannuitization. Utility gained from life insurance: relative increase in the couples' certainty equivalent of indirect utility at age 65 gained by the access to the life insurance market all other parameters being equal. Base case parameterization: = 5, = 0.96, = 1.3, = 2, a wealth/income ratio of 8, and access to the stock market. Source: authors' calculations. Averages of key household quantities for different age groups (age of husband) of the HRS waves 5 to 10. The sample consists of married or partnered households in which the husband is at least 65 years old, at least one spouse receives social security retirement and none receives any labor income. To avoid outliers households with negative financial wealth as well as the top 5% both in financial wealth and household income distribution are excluded. Term life insurance participation equals 1, if life insurance holdings but no endowment plans are reported, 0 otherwise. The average life insurance face values (in 2010 dollars) are conditioned on term life insurance holdings. Pension participation equals 1, if positive pension income is reported, 0 otherwise. Husband pension income share is defined as pension income of the husband divided by the sum of the pension income of both spouses and conditioned on at least one spouse receiving pension income. Source: authors' calculations. 3 ). Baseline is the spouse being male, 65 years old, and 3 years older than his partner (sample mean is 2.55 for husbands), having 3 children (sample mean is 3.2) and the same pension income as the other spouse and the household having sample mean log financial wealth (10.91) and log household income (10.23) without participating in the stock market. The corresponding probability for holding term life insurance is 32.48%. Marginal probabilities represent the respective changes in the probability from being female, increasing the number of children by 1, the age by 10 years or the age difference by 1 year, being the only pension income receiver in the household, a 1 standard deviation increase in log financial wealth (2.16) or log household income (0.53), as well as from participating in the stock market. The p-values account for cluster robust standard errors. Source: authors' calculations. Notes: This table presents coefficients and marginal effects of an OLS regression on the (log) face values of term life insurance holdings for the subsample of term life insurance holders. The baseline case of an 65 years old male spouse, being 3 years older than his partner (subsample mean is 2.60 for husbands), having 3 children (subsample mean is 3.2) and the same pension income as the other spouse and the household having subsample mean log financial wealth (10.74) and log household income (10.27) without participating in the stock market, has a face value of $33,300. The marginal effects are the relative changes in face values from being female, increasing the number of children by 1, the age by 10 years or the age difference by 1 year, being the only pension income receiver in the household, a 1 standard deviation increase in log financial wealth (2.15) or log household income (0.53), as well as from participating in the stock market. The p-values account for cluster robust standard errors. Source: authors' calculations. Notes: This table shows the annuity demand predicted by our model and the corresponding increase in the certainty equivalent of utility from having access to the private annuity market for various empirical wealth quantiles at age 65. The second column shows the corresponding financial wealth. The third column shows the mean wealth to income ratio for the quantiles (mean of subsample between +5% and -5% around the quantile). The fourth column reports the model based optimal expenditures on annuities as a fraction of financial wealth in case annuities are available only at age 65. The fifth column shows the corresponding increase in the certainty equivalent of utility at age 65 gained by the access to the private annuity market. Source: authors' calculations. 
Notes:
The couple has a level of risk aversion = 5, time preference rate = 0.96, consumption scaling factor = 1.3, and parameter for bequest = 2. We use optimal feedback controls obtained from the stochastic optimization for a couple with maximum lifespan of (husband's) age 103; expectations are computed from 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations conditional on the survival of both spouses with initial total wealth set to 100. 
